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Introduction
Why did Yugoslavia fall apart? Was its violent demise inevitable? Did its 
population simply fall victim to the lure of nationalism? How did this multina-
tional state manage to survive for so long? And where do we situate the short 
life of Yugoslavia in the long history of the twentieth century? This book tells 
the story of why and under which conditions Yugoslavia was created, what 
held the multinational state together for more than seventy years, and why it 
finally broke apart in violence. It is a tale of confidence and doubt, of progress 
and decline, of extremes and excesses, of utopia and demise.
No other European country was as colorful, multifaceted, or complex 
as Yugoslavia. Its turbulent history made it a byword for Balkan confusion 
and animosity; it stood for the backward, barbaric, and abhorrent contrast to 
the supposedly so civilized European continent. At the end of the nineteenth 
century, to cross the Danube by steamboat from the Austrian city of Semlin 
(Zemun) to Belgrade or travel by the Hungarian state railway over the great 
iron Sava Bridge to reach the train station of Bosanski Brod was to enter an 
exotic world that appeared both mysterious and fabulous but also at times 
appalling and threatening.1 Shrouded in such mystery and foreignness, “the 
Balkans” were consistently written out of the European context, as unfor-
tunately still happens occasionally even today. However, a closer look soon 
dispels this shroud of mystery, because the region is tightly intertwined in the 
timeline of Europe’s history in both good and bad ways. Although popular 
images and stereotypes of a backward and violence-ridden “European other” 
have since been debunked as a “convenient prejudice,” the idea of the region’s 
structural backwardness persists, without the least empirical evidence.2
In contrast, this book addresses Yugoslav history from the perspective 
of the major social, economic, and intellectual changes that affected all of 
Europe at the turn of the twentieth century and marked its transition to modern 
industrialized mass society. The “great acceleration” first reached Western 
societies but soon expanded out toward the European periphery.3 The em-
phasis here will not be primarily on structures of the longue durée and the 
unique developments in Balkan history, but on the overarching dynamics of 
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change, on interrelations and interaction, and on common European features 
and parallels during the “long twentieth century.” 4
In Southeast Europe, the economy, social relations, cultural expression, 
mentalities, and daily life were undergoing fundamental transformation in the 
decades around 1900. The region also faced unanticipated challenges from the 
scientific-technological and economic progress of the West. Growing interna-
tional competition and aggressive imperialism made it imperative to overcome 
backwardness as a matter of survival, in a very literal sense. It was against this 
background that the South Slavic idea took shape: the project of a common 
political future for culturally related peoples unified in a single state. After all, 
the liberation from foreign rule and the founding of an independent and sov-
ereign Yugoslavia appeared to be the premise for securing a self-determined 
future in Europe.
Twice, in 1918 and 1945, Yugoslavia became a reality, each time with 
a thoroughly different political system: first as a centralized, constitutional, 
and parliamentary monarchy, then as a one-party socialist federation. Both 
models faced four fundamental long-term problems: the unresolved national 
question that challenged the identity and cohesion of the state; the underdevel-
opment and poverty in a predominantly peasant society; and the dependence 
on foreign political and economic powers. These three problems exacerbated 
the fourth, namely the enormous historical, cultural, and socioeconomic dis-
parities between the various components of multiethnic Yugoslavia, which 
repeatedly raised anew issues concerning political legitimacy and a suitable 
constitutional order.
One of the main questions addressed here is how, under these circum-
stances, development and progress were conceived at various times and what 
means were employed to pursue them. An increasing number of the elite 
believed that they were living in an age in which tradition, customs, patri-
archy, and long-existing community relations were vanishing — and should 
vanish — to make way for the advantages and merits of modernity, specifically 
of a world of expanding technology. However, competing political forces and 
intellectuals embraced very different answers to the coercions, aspirations, 
and challenges of a dramatically changing world. Who were the agents driv-
ing social change, and how did they envision the future? What alternatives to 
Western modernity were discussed?
The approach adopted in this book distances itself from popular explana-
tions of the Yugoslav problem that emphasize ethnic, religious, and cultural 
divisions, or incompatible and even “clashing” civilizations. Instead of noto-
rious Balkan intractability and ancient hatreds, the argument presented here 
stresses the politicization of differences in twentieth-century modern mass 
society. Peoples, nations, and cultures are not transhistorical entities; they 
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are subject to historical realities and change, and so are conflicts. A central 
question thus focuses on why, how, and under what conditions ethnic identity 
and diversity were turned into a matter of contention and by whom. Important 
are the interests, views, and motives of the major actors, the socioeconomic 
developments, and, last but not least, the cultural-historical dimensions of 
collective experiences, memories, and interpretations of history.
Very few scholars have yet attempted to provide a comprehensive history 
of Yugoslavia covering the entire twentieth century.5 The pickings are partic-
ularly thin in the literature of the Yugoslav successor states.6 Even before the 
wars of the 1990s, it was a tricky business to seek a common denominator 
among the various regional and national perspectives. Federalism, also in 
the realm of academia, granted each people its own way of dealing with its 
past, its own national images and narratives of its history. As a result, no 
master narrative ever evolved that was supported by all: too different, too 
politically laden were the interpretations and depictions. Quarrels over in-
terpretation cut short the multivolume History of the Yugoslav Peoples at the 
year 1800. Likewise, the History of the Yugoslav Communist Party/League of 
Communists disappeared into oblivion. Nor did the historical contributions to 
the Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia fare any better. Since the country’s inception 
there has never been a standard narrative about Yugoslavia’s origins, historical 
development, and problems. So far, everyone attempting the task has ended 
up in the crossfire of criticism.7
In stark contrast to the scarcity of general comprehensive works is the 
overabundance of books and articles dealing with the Yugoslav wars of the 
1990s. For the most part, they interpret Yugoslavia’s history from the per-
spective of its bloody demise, analyze its congenital defects, and characterize 
the creation of the South Slavic state as artificial in order to underscore the 
inevitability of its failure. Yet Yugoslavia cannot be explained only by the 
way it began or the way it ended. The state existed for a good seventy years, 
which raises the question about what held its peoples together for so long and 
what eventually divided them, a question that has not become obsolete since 
Yugoslavia fell apart. This book attempts to avoid deterministic explanations 
and to grasp the history of Yugoslavia as an essentially open-ended process 
from different thematic approaches.
Many recent studies no longer deal with Yugoslavia but concentrate en-
tirely on its successor states. The existence of Slovenia, Croatia, or Kosovo 
today is interpreted retrospectively and the past is read teleologically, as if dis-
tant history was a harbinger of modern statehood. Interactions with neighbors 
are often presented only in the form of conflicts and wars. In the process, the 
Yugoslav period is reduced to a very short — albeit not completely insignifi-
cant — episode in a centuries-long national history. By contrast, the objective 
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of this book is to encapsulate various local and national historical perspectives 
and place them in relation to one another, which then relativizes many an al-
leged regional particularity. However, in order to maintain a balance between 
diversity and unity, the various republics and peoples can only be treated in 
an illustrative manner. In many instances, Eastern Bosnia serves as the mi-
crohistorical example, for it is the proverbial heart of Yugoslavia over which 
many sides have fought in the course of the twentieth century.
This book is conceived as a topically comprehensive but compact ap-
proach to a complex, almost boundless, subject whose potential for study is 
far from exhausted. It is based in part on my own research but primarily on a 
broad scope of secondary literature. Publications on specific topics and time 
periods are numerous, but syntheses remain few and far between, and there are 
many areas in which little or no research has been done. This is particularly 
true with regard to the post-1945 period.
Every general overview needs a perspective and a focal point that decide 
how to select topics and questions. No narrative, therefore, can do without 
condensing and generalizing. Certain subjects that are the standard narrative 
of Yugoslavia’s political history were kept short so as to better examine the 
deeper underlying socioeconomic and cultural dynamics and the daily life of 
common people in addition to the events and major actors. The chronological 
narrative alternates with cross-sectional analyses, which offers a deeper look 
into society and culture at a given period of time. A lack of space in the end-
notes prevented the extensive citation of each important work that influenced 
this book. To facilitate readability, reference is often made to “Yugoslavs,” 
namely to citizens with no mention of their ethnic affiliation. Nationality was 
specified only when the way people identified themselves was relevant to 
explain certain contexts.
Terminology, in this context, is a real minefield. Should one speak of na-
tions, nationalities, or ethnic groups? Did peoples speak different languages or 
just varieties or dialects of one common language? Notions of all these terms 
have changed over time, as will be discussed here, and they have been and 
still are a matter of political disputes.
Interpretations of the Yugoslav past are even more emotionally laden, and 
discussions are often conducted not with factual but with moral arguments. 
Opposing interpretations of history provide explosive material for political 
confrontation. Those who do not clearly choose one side or another quickly 
open themselves up to unpleasant polemics. Grounded in the fundamental 
principles of good academic practice, this account attempts to weigh the 
various perspectives against one another, even if the limited space does not 
permit the extensive treatment of all theories and controversies. In the spirit 
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of Alexis de Tocqueville, I hope to have written this book without prejudice 
but not without passion.
This book was made possible by the generous support of the Freiburg 
Institute for Advanced Studies (FRIAS), which awarded me an eighteen-month 
research sabbatical. I am particularly indebted to Ulrich Herbert for inspiring 
this project and including it in the German series European History in the 
20th Century. Also, I am most grateful to Charles Ingrao for encouraging 
the English edition, which was thematically expanded and updated to include 
most recent research. Dona Geyer’s thorough translation and the invaluable 
comments by two anonymous readers were greatly appreciated. Last but not 
least, I thank Purdue University Press and Verlag C.H. Beck for their unfail-
ingly gracious and active support.

Abbreviations
AVNOJ Antifascist Council of the People’s Liberation of 
Yugoslavia (Antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja 
Jugoslavije)
BITEF Belgrade International Theater Festival (Beogradski 
Internacio nalni Teatarski Festival)
BSC Bosnian-Serbian-Croatian
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CPY Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Komunistička partija 
Jugo slavije)
DEMOS Democratic Opposition of Slovenia (Demokratska 
opozicija Slov enije)
DFJ Democratic Federal Yugoslavia (Demokratska 
Federativna Ju go slavija)
FNRJ Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (Federativna 
Narodna Republika Jugoslavija)
FYROM The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
HDZ Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska 
zajednica)
HDZ-BiH Croatian Democratic Union, Bosnia-Herzegovina
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia
IDP Internally Displaced Person
JMO Yugoslav Muslim Organization (Jugoslovenska musli-
manska organizacija)
JNA Yugoslav People’s Army (Jugoslavenska narodna 
armija)
LDK Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike 
e Kosovës)
MASPOK Masovni pokret (Mass Movement)
NDH Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država 
Hrvatska)
xvi Abbreviations
NIN Nedeljne Informativne Novine (Informative weekly 
magazine)
OIC Organization of Islamic Cooperation
OKW German High Command (Oberkommando der 
Wehrmacht)
OOUR Basic Organization of Associated Labor (Osnovna orga-
nizacija udru ženog rada)
ORJUNA Organization of Yugoslav Nationalists (Organizacija 
Jugoslav enskih nacionalista)
OZNA Department for the People’s Protection (Odsjek za 
zaštitu naroda)
SANU Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (Srpska aka-
demija nauka i umetnosti)
SDA Party of Democratic Action (Stranka demokratske 
akcije)
SDS Serb Democratic Party (Srpska demokratska stranka)
SLS Slovene People’s Party (Slovenska ljudska stranka)
SFRJ Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Socijalistička 
Federativna Republika Jugoslavija)
SHS Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Kraljevina 
Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca)
SIV Federal Executive Council (Savezno izvršno vijeće)
SOUR Complex Organization of Associated Labor (Složena 
organizacija udruženog rada)
TO BiH Territorial Defence Force of the Republic of Bosnia 
and Hercegovina (Teritorijalna odbrana Bosne i 
Hercegovine)
UÇK Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës)
UDB State Security Administration (Uprava državne 
bezbednosti)
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
VMRO Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization 
(Vnatrešna Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizacija)
VMRO-DPMNE Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization—
Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity 
(Vnatrešna Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizacija—
Demokratska Partija za Makedonsko Nacionalno 
Edinstvo)
Chronology
About 1800–1918 South Slavic Movement and the founding  
of Yugoslavia
1804–1813 First Serb Uprising against the Ottoman Empire
1809–1813 Founding of the “Illyrian Provinces” along the north and east 
coasts of the Adriatic Sea by Napoleon Bonaparte; harmoni-
zation of administration and standardization of the “Slavonic 
language”
1814 Creation of the Kingdom of Illyria as successor state to 
Illyrian Provinces after the territory’s repossession by Austria-
Hungary; existence until 1849
1815–1817 Second Serb Uprising
1830 Founding of the Illyrian Movement by Ljudevit Gaj (promot-
ing the idea of South Slavic cultural unity); autonomy of the 
Principality of Serbia
1835 Novine Horvatzke (Croatian news) and Danicza (Morning star), 
publications advancing the cause of the Illyrian Movement
1844 Načertanije (The plan) by Serbian statesman Ilija Garašanin 
propagating the idea of expanding Serbia’s borders and 
influence
1848/1849 Hungarian Revolution against the rule of the Austrian 
Habsburg monarchy
1849 Founding of Croatia-Slavonia as a crown land within the 
Habsburg monarchy; appointment of Baron Josip Jelačić as 
governor (Ban)
1850 Vienna (Literary) Agreement on a standardized Serbo-
Croatian language based on the Štokavian dialect
1860 Jugoslovjenstvo, a manifesto by the Croat historian Franjo 
Rački on Yugoslavism
1866 Founding of the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts in 
Zagreb by Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer and Franjo Rački
1868 Croatian-Hungarian Settlement (Nagodba) between Hungary 
and the Triune Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia
xviii Chronology
1875–1878 Great Eastern Crisis; Russo-Turkish War
1878 Congress of Berlin; occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by 
Austria- Hungary; independence of Serbia and Montenegro; 
Kosovo and Macedonia remain in the Ottoman Empire; 
Slovenian and Croatian territories remain part of the Habsburg 
Monarchy (Slovenia, Dalmatia, Istria under Austrian rule; 
Croatia and Vojvodina under Hungarian); emergence of the 
Albanian national movement (League of Prizren)
1881 Abolishment of the Military Frontier
1882 Principality of Serbia becomes the Kingdom of Serbia
1889 Five hundredth anniversary of the historic Battle of Ko sovo (28 
June)
1892 Birth of Josip Broz in Kumrovec (Croatia)
1893 Founding of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization
1903 Murder of Serbian king Aleksandar Obrenović; election of 
Peter I. Karadjordjević as his successor; Ilinden Uprising 
of Macedonians against the Ottoman Empire; “People’s 
Movement” and mass protests against the Hungarian governor 
in Croatia
1905 Resolution of Fiume calling for Croatian self-rule and general 
civil rights and liberties; Serb–Croat party coalition in Croatia; 
“New Course” in Serb–Croat cooperation
1906–1911 Austro-Hungarian customs war against Serbia (“Pig War”)
1908 Annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary; 
Bosnian annexation crisis; partition of Sandžak between Ser-
bia and Montenegro; founding of the Serb National Defense 
(Narodna odbrana)
1909 First pan-Yugoslav conference of South Slavic socialists
1911 Founding of the Black Hand
1912 Founding of the Balkan League by Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, 
and Montenegro to liberate “European Turkey”; First Balkan 
War (against the Ottoman Empire); founding of Albania
1913 Demise of the Balkan League due to conflicts over the partition 
of Macedonia; Second Balkan War (between the former allies); 
Treaty of Bucharest; annexation of Kosovo by Serbia and the 
partition of Macedonia between Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria
1914 Assassination of Austrian crown prince Franz Ferdinand in 
Sarajevo by Gavrilo Princip; Austro-Hungarian declaration of 
war on Serbia; July Crisis and the outbreak of the First World 
War; Austrian invasion into Serbia
 Chronology xix
1915 Retreat of the Serbian government and army through Albania 
to Corfu (“Albanian Golgotha”); occupation of Serbia and 
Macedonia by the Central Powers; founding of the Yugoslav 
Committee in London, headed by Ante Trumbić
1917 Corfu Declaration; agreement between the Croat-led Yugoslav 
Committee and the Serbian government on the founding of a 
South Slavic kingdom under the Karadjordjević dynasty
1918 Allied breakthrough on the Salonica Front; surrender of 
Austria-Hungary; founding of the National Council of 
Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs; secession of South Slavs from the 
Habsburg monarchy and resolution to unify with Serbia
1918–1941 The First Yugoslavia
1918 Proclamation creating the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slo-
venes (SHS) by King Peter I. Karadjordjević
1919–1920 Paris Peace Treaties; international recognition of the Kingdom 
of SHS and the demarcation of its borders; founding of the Free 
State of Fiume by Gabriele d’Annunzio
1920 Popular referendum in Carinthia; creation of the Little Entente 
with Czechoslovakia and Romania as part of the French secu-
rity system; introduction of universal male suffrage; elections 
to the constitutional assembly; founding and outlawing of the 
Communist Party of Yugoslavia
1921 Passage of the centralist Vidovdan Constitution despite Croat 
boycott; intensification of the Serb-Croat constitutional conflict
1924 Third Party Congress of the CPY with a focus on the national 
question (recognition of different Yugoslav peoples/nations)
1925 Treaty of Nettuno on the demarcation of Italy’s borders
1928 Assassination in the Skupština (National Assembly) of the 
Croa tian Peasant Party politician Stjepan Radić; government 
crisis
1929 Suspension of the constitution by King Alexander 
Karadjordjević; declaration of a royal dictatorship; renaming 
of the SHS state to “Kingdom of Yugoslavia”; administrative 
reorganization into banovine; founding of the Croat Ustasha 
movement
1930 Intensification of the Great Depression’s impact on Yugoslavia
1931 Constitutional octroi and the introduction of a sham democratic 
system
1934 Assassination of King Alexander I in Marseille; regency of 
Paul Karadjordjević
xx Chronology
1935 Election of the semiauthoritarian Milan Stojadinović as prime 
minister; abatement of Great Depression; state intervention in 
the economy; rapprochement with Germany and Italy
1936 Liquidation of farmers’ debts
1937 Failure of the Concordat with the Vatican
1939 Tito ś official appointment to the position of CPY General 
Secretary; Serb-Croat Settlement (Sporazum) to create the 
autonomous Banovina of Croatia
1941–1945 The Second World War
1941 Entry of Yugoslavia into the Tripartite Pact; military coup 
in Belgrade; German attack on Yugoslavia (Operation 
Retribution); surrender of Yugoslav army; flight into exile of 
the king and his government; dissolution of Yugoslavia; found-
ing of the Independent State of Croatia (under Ante Pavelić); 
German military government in Serbia (Milan Nedić’s regime); 
annexation of various areas by Italy, Germany, Hungary, 
Albania, and Bulgaria; formation of a nationalist Serb resis-
tance movement under Draža Mihailović (Chetniks) and the 
Yugoslav communist partisan movement under Josip Broz 
(Tito); “general insurrection”; the founding and fall of the 
partisan republic of Užice; extreme acts of “retribution” by 
occupational forces; massive “ethnic cleansing”; start of the 
extermination of Jews and Roma
1942 Battle of Sutjeska; first meeting of the Antifascist Council 
of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia Antifascist Council 
(AVNOJ) in Bihać
1943 Launching of Operation White and Operation Black by 
German military to combat partisans; Battle of Neretva; Italy’s 
surrender; second meeting of the Antifascist Council of the 
People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) in Jajce; announce-
ment of creation of a federal and socialist Yugoslavia; Allied 
recognition of Tito; partisan military victories
1944 March of the People’s Liberation Army into Belgrade; Vis 
Agreement between Tito and the royal exile government on 
the re-establishment of Yugoslavia; formation of a common in-
terim government; measures expropriating the ethnic German 
population
1945 Unconditional surrender of Germany; Bleiburg massacre; cre-
ation of the People’s Front; abolition of the monarchy
 Chronology xxi
1945–1991 The Second Yugoslavia
1945 Proclamation of the creation of the Democratic Federal 
Yugoslavia (DFJ); elections to the constitutional assembly; 
Trieste crisis; land reform and state purchasing program for 
agricultural produce
1946 Constitution of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FNRJ); partition into six equal constituent republics; war 
criminal trials; nationalization of large landholdings, banks, 
and means of production
1947  Paris Peace Conference; recognition of Yugoslavia’s borders 
(annexation of Istria without Trieste)
1948 Break with Stalin; expulsion of Yugoslavia from Cominform; 
political purges
1949 Expulsion from the founding of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance
1950 Introduction of self-management system; Cazin peasant upris-
ing; Yugoslavia’s stance of neutrality between the power blocs 
in the East–West conflict
1952 Renaming of Communist Party of Yugoslavia as the League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia
1953 Constitutional reform incorporating the self-management 
system
1954 Expulsion of Milovan Djilas from the Central Committee of 
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia; normalization of re-
lations with the Soviet Union; Novi Sad agreement on a written 
Serbo-Croatian language in two variants
1955 Declaration in Moscow by Khrushchev and Tito on the right 
of every country to pursue socialism its own way; Bandung 
Conference and the beginnings of the Nonaligned Movement
1957 Severance of diplomatic relations by West Germany in line 
with the Hallstein Doctrine
1961 First conference of the Nonaligned Movement in Belgrade
1963 Passage of a new constitution transforming the Federal 
People’s Republic of Yugoslavia into the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY); formation of the Praxis group
1964 Eighth Party Congress of the League of Communists; introduc-
tion of market-economy reforms and the federalization of the 
constitution
1966 Removal of Aleksandar Ranković as the head of the secret 
police
xxii Chronology
1967 “Declaration on the Status and Name of the Croatian Literary 
Language”
1968 Student revolts; Albanian uprising in Kosovo and West 
Macedonia; recognition of Bosnian Muslims as the sixth 
constituent people; introduction of national security doctrine of 
“All-People’s Defense”
1970 Islamic Declaration by Alija Izetbegović
1971 Croatian Spring; ousting from power of party leadership in 
Zagreb; constitutional amendment expanding the federalization 
of Yugoslavia; Brezhnev’s visit to Belgrade
1972 Ousting from power of party leadership in Belgrade; political 
purge within the party
1974 Passage of a new constitution; granting of greater authority and 
power to the republics and autonomous provinces; confirma-
tion of Tito as president for life
1976 Law on Associated Labor to expand self-management
1977 CSCE meeting in Belgrade
1980 Tito’s death; collective presidency: growing economic prob-
lems and national tensions
1981 Kosovo uprising; imposition of martial law; political trials
1987 Rise of Slobodan Milošević to the top of party leadership in 
Serbia; party infighting with Serbian president Ivan Stambolić; 
memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts; 
nationalistic meetings and mobilization efforts; Bosnian 
Agrokomerc affair
1989 Election of Slobodan Milošević as Serbia’s president; revoca-
tion of autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina; 600th anniversary 
celebration of the Battle of Kosovo; economic crisis; growing 
conflict over reform within Yugoslavia; institutional paralysis 
and legislative backlog
1990 Disbanding of the League of Communists; introduction of 
the multiparty system; failure of reforms proposed by Ante 
Marković; Franjo Tudjman’s assumption of power as Croatia’s 
president; declarations of sovereignty by the parliaments of 
Slovenia, Croatia, and Kosovo; Slovenian referendum on 
independence; Serb-Montenegrin veto of the Croat Stipe Mesić 
as the president of Yugoslavia; declaration of autonomy by 
Croatian Serbs
1991–2018 Collapse of Yugoslavia and Successor States
1991 Violent incidents in the regions of Croatia inhabited by Serbs; 
declarations of independence by Slovenia, Croatia, and 
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Macedonia; deployment of the Yugoslav People’s Army; out-
break of war in Slovenia and Croatia; German recognition of 
Slovenia and Croatia; declaration creating the Republic of Serb 
Krajina; resolution on independence passed by Bosnian diet 
despite Serb veto.
1992 Ceasefire and the stationing of UNPROFOR in Croatia; 
founding of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by Serbia and 
Montenegro; founding of the Serb Republic within Bosnia-
Herzegovina; independence referendum and international 
recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina; outbreak of war; massive 
“ethnic cleansing” actions
1993 “War within the war” between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-
Herzegovina; creation of UN safe areas; establishment of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
1994 Shelling of the Markale market in Sarajevo; begin of NATO 
air strikes against Serb positions; founding of the Federation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina by Croats and Muslims
1995 Croatian military operations Flash and Storm to retake 
Krajina; Srebrenica massacre; Dayton Peace Accord
1996 Founding of the Kosovo Liberation Army
1998 Armed conflict between Albanian guerilla fighters and Serb 
security forces in Kosovo; mass exodus and expulsion
1999 Failure of the Rambouillet negotiations for a self-governed 
Kosovo; NATO strikes against targets in Serbia and Kosovo; 
UN Resolution 1244 setting up an interim administration mis-
sion in Kosovo; start of the process to determine the status of 
Kosovo
2000 Defeat of Slobodan Milošević by the democratic opposition in 
Serbia; start of the EU Stabilization and Association Process 
for the Western Balkan states
2001 Armed revolt by Albanian extremists in South Serbia and 
Macedonia; Ohrid Framework Agreement on equal rights for 
Albanians
2003 Transformation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the 
State Union of Serbia and Montenegro
2004 Accession of Slovenia to the European Union
2006 Referendum on independence and international recognition of 
Montenegro
2008 Unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo
2013 Accession of Croatia to the European Union
2018 European Commission’s new Western Balkan Strategy

PART I
the South SlavIc MoveMent and the  




The South Slavic Countries around 1900:  
The Dawn of a New Century
At the turn of the century, optimism prevailed throughout the entire South 
Slavic region. Even in very remote corners like the provincial Bosnian town 
of Višegrad, wrote the town’s chronicler Ivo Andrić, “events too quickened 
their pace. . . . Exciting news was no longer something rare and unusual but 
an everyday food and a real need. The whole of life seemed to be hastening 
somewhere, suddenly speeded up, as a freshet quickens its pace before it 
breaks into rapids, rushes over steep rocks and becomes a cascade.”1 However, 
at this point only a few people were aware that they were living in an era of 
millenarian changes and that intellectual innovation and political impetus 
were also emerging from profound social upheavals. In any case, the young 
Bosnian revolutionary Vladimir Gaćinović hoped that the old feudal system, 
the major clans, and the patriarchal mindset of his home would soon belong 
to the past and that new ideas and a strong push to create a nation state would 
emerge.2 Since large areas of the countryside still remained mired in dire pov-
erty and old traditions, the idea of integrating all South Slavs into a single state 
appeared to be no more than a pipe dream in the eyes of many people. At the 
time it was not evident, let alone certain, that one day their so very dissimilar 
regions would indeed merge into a single body politic. It quickly becomes clear 
just how complicated the starting point truly was when we retrospectively 
comb the historical regions of Yugoslavia in fast motion.
The Historical Regions
At the turn of the century, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were living in two 
empires — the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman — and in two independent 
nation states — Serbia and Montenegro. Therefore, our fictional trip through 
the South Slavic countries around 1900 begins in the Austrian crown lands 
of Carniola, Styria, Carinthia, Gorizia, Istria, and then moves to Trieste, the 
home to approximately 1.32 million Slovenes, who would become the smallest 
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population located the farthest west in what would later be the multinational 
state of Yugoslavia. In Trieste they made up about three-fourths of the popula-
tion and lived in confluence with Germans, Italians, Croats, and other peoples. 
They were the only group among the South Slavs never to have suffered longer 
phases of military threat, wartime destruction, or even depopulation. Their 
agriculture was varied and productive, and the standard of living and level of 
education were higher here than in the neighboring regions. The architecture 
reflected nearly 500 years of Habsburg rule and still today seems quintessen-
tially Austrian. The areas in which Slovenes lived were still split into different 
administrative jurisdictions, but even in the past there had never been a state 
entity named Slovenia.3
Further west and south, the Slovenian regions passed seamlessly into the 
settlement areas of the approximately 2.9 million Croats, who were also part 
of Austria-Hungary.4 The Croats exemplified internal fragmentation to an 
even greater degree than the Slovenes. They were dispersed throughout no 
less than seven separate political-territorial units within the Habsburg mon-
archy, each with very different socioeconomic structures, ethnic mixes, and 
cultural influences. Croatia-Slavonia enjoyed autonomy within the Hungarian 
half of the empire. Istria and Dalmatia, however, were under direct Austrian 
rule, whereas the port city of Fiume (Rijeka), as a corpus separatum, was 
governed by Hungary. Croats also lived in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in south-
ern Hungary. Until the outbreak of the First World War, not a single railway 
connection existed between Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.5
Highly diverse cultural influences intermingled in Croatian regions. In 
the cities of northern and eastern Croatia, such as Zagreb, Varaždin, and 
Osijek, the Austrian and southern German influences are still evident today 
in the baroque style of aristocratic residences and the old town centers and in 
the interiors of city palaces and patrician homes. Along the coast, in Dalmatia 
and Istria, the architecture in cities like Pula, Split, and Dubrovnik points 
to ancient origins as well as to the centuries-long and very close ties to the 
cultures and histories of Venice, Florence, and Rome.6
Since 1881, Croatia-Slavonia also had included the former Military 
Frontier (krajina), a province under special military administration that ex-
isted for 400 years. This area extended along the Sava and Danube rivers 
before reaching the Adriatic coast farther south in western Bosnia. In order to 
shield its empire militarily from the “Turkish peril,” Vienna had settled Serb 
refugees and others as free soldier-peasants in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries and created an administrative district with its own social order. 
These “frontiersmen” formed military regiments to defend the monarchy.7 
The Habsburgs had also attracted non-Slavic colonists to the area, including 
German-speaking Danube Swabians.
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Beyond the Military Frontier lay Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 1878 Congress 
of Berlin had placed it under Austro-Hungarian military occupation, while 
formally leaving it under the administration of the Ottomans, who had ruled 
there since the fifteenth century. In 1908, the Austrian emperor annexed it in 
a surprise move, thereby also incorporating into the empire the autochthonous 
Muslim population. Around 1900, the South Slavic population totaled about 
1.6 million, of which 43 percent were Orthodox Christian, 35 percent Muslim, 
21 percent Roman Catholic, and the rest a combination of Jews, Vlachs, Turks, 
Roma, and other minorities.
The first thing to stand out in this newly annexed territory was the archi-
tectural mastery of the Turkish builders. Sarajevo dazzled visitors with the 
magnificence of the Gazi Husrev-beg Mosque, one of the largest and most 
artistic religious buildings left by Islam on European soil. Also world famous 
was the bold sweep of the stone bridge over the Drina in Višegrad, which, 
according to its inscription, could be found “nowhere else in the world.”8 Built 
in the fifteenth century on orders of the Grand Vizier Mehmed Paša Sokolović, 
a child of the region, this remnant of East–West interlock was immortalized 
by Ivo Andrić in his Nobel Prize–winning novel.9 And then there is the Drina 
River itself. Originally the Turks and Austrians declared it to be the dividing 
line between their empires; later, in the twentieth century, it became a highly 
contested site of memory. Was the picturesque river the supportive backbone 
of Serb settlement beyond the political borders of Serbia or was it the insur-
mountable watershed between Catholic and Orthodox civilizations? For their 
part, the communists later summarily declared the Drina to be a symbol of 
Yugoslav unity.
Under Austro-Hungarian rule, all of Bosnia-Herzegovina was exposed 
to central European architectural influences. Sarajevo received a modern 
city center with representational administrative buildings, a theater, and a 
central post office right next to the Turkish old town with its bazaar — the 
Baščaršija — numerous mosques, hammams, Koran schools, dervish monas-
teries, and caravansaries.10 In the late nineteenth century, the traveler Heinrich 
Renner wrote: “looks more Turkish here than in Sofia and Philippopolis; the 
regional costume still prevails; turban and fez are preferred,” despite the al-
ready “prevalent” European clothing.11
Travel was very strenuous at the time. The trip by coach, caravan, or 
horse from Sarajevo to Mostar, located about 84 miles away, lasted three 
grueling days. To venture into more remote regions, a person either used one 
of the hazardous horse trails or walked.12 Therefore, from eastern Bosnia it 
took a difficult climb through the mountains to reach Montenegro, which 
had been independent since 1878. For centuries, the seclusion of the Karst 
had conserved the traditional clan order. The overwhelming majority of the 
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Montenegrin population were Orthodox Slavs, but a few thousand Turkish, 
Albanian, and Slavic Muslims also lived there. This tiny country with its 
population of about 200,000 always captured the imagination of foreign vis-
itors, in particular, as a symbol for the irrepressible will of a small mountain 
people to be free; as the homeland of banditry, blood feuds, and barbarism; 
and not least as the stage for comical political conditions. Except for a small 
idyllic strip of coastline, the living conditions here were merciless. The coun-
try had almost no infrastructure, what cattle-raising and meager farming there 
was yielded little, and indescribable poverty prevailed. Deep in the interior, 
explained the Montenegrin Milovan Djilas, a close collaborator of Tito, this 
land was “extremely barren and crippling quiet,” a place where “all things 
living and all things created by the human hand” vanished. “There is no oak, 
no white or copper beach, just dry, brittle, barely green grass. . . . Everything 
is stone.”13
Crossing the jagged mountains on the arduous zigzag of a Turkish road, 
the traveler reached the southernmost point of what would later be Yugoslav 
territory, namely the harbor of Bar, and a few miles farther inland, Lake 
Skadar, through which the Albanian border would run one day. Along this 
narrow coastline, the Mediterranean-Venetian flair returned. For centuries this 
area served as the most important and often the only link to western Europe.
Beyond Lake Skadar stretched those regions of the future Yugoslavia that 
belonged to the Ottoman Empire until 1912/1913 and were considered par-
ticularly backward and poor. The administrative district (vilayet) of Kosovo, 
created in 1879 with the capital city of Üsküb (Skopje), included a greater 
part of today’s Kosovo and Macedonia, over which Greece, Bulgaria, and 
the new nation state of Serbia have fought. More than 1.6 million inhabi-
tants created a unique ethnic and religious mixture. The population was fairly 
evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and was split into numerous 
language groups.
At the time, special status was given to the primarily Muslim-inhabited 
administrative district Sanjak of Novi Pazar, which separated Serbia from 
Montenegro. In 1878, the Congress of Berlin conceded to the Austrian em-
peror the right to occupy the strategically important area. In 1913, it was 
divided up between Montenegro and Serbia.
The Principality of Serbia gained de facto semi-independence from the 
Ottoman Empire as a result of two uprisings (1804–1813 and 1815–1817). 
Autonomy was legally granted in 1830, and independence was internationally 
recognized in 1878. In 1900, 2.5 million people lived here, of whom nine-
tenths were Serbs and the rest Vlachs, Roma, and other diverse groups.14 
Another two million or so Serbs lived in the Habsburg monarchy. In the 
north, at the confluence of the Sava and Danube rivers, stood the originally 
oriental-Balkan capital city of Belgrade, which for most of its long history had 
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served as a strategically significant border town, military post, administrative 
city, and trade center. After the Ottomans left, it was completely reconstructed 
in the Western style typical of Vienna and Pest. From here it was just a small 
jump to the southern Hungarian province of Vojvodina, from which the Serb 
national movement had emerged during the Enlightenment. As a result of the 
Austro-Hungarian colonization, the population of 1.3 million then consisted of 
Magyars (32 percent), Serbs (29 percent), Germans (23 percent), and numerous 
other nationalities such as Croats, Romanians, and Ruthenians.15
Peoples, Nations, Identities
At the turn of the century, around twelve million people lived in the historic 
regions of the future Yugoslavia. The majority were South Slavs of Catholic, 
Orthodox, and Muslim faiths, and the rest created a conglomerate of various 
other ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups, including Turks, Albanians, 
Germans, Magyars, Jews, Roma, Vlachs, and others.
Local intellectuals and writers, like so many other Europeans of the nine-
teenth century, believed that communities needed to be organized as “nations” 
to secure political participation, cultural rights, and social justice. Nationhood 
was mainly understood as a cultural and linguistic category out of which the 
proponents of nationalism thought to create an organic whole. Yet, in most 
regions, the composition of the population was confusing, to put it mildly. 
Over the course of decades, an elaborate history of migratory movements 
from various places, religious conversions, and different kinds of cultural 
hybridization had thoroughly and repeatedly jumbled and reset the pieces of 
the ethnic mosaic. For this reason, contacts, cultural transfers, and cultural 
interweaving on various levels always played a major role.
Around 1900, the idea of a “Yugoslav” nation was as obscure as was a 
well-defined notion of what it meant to call oneself “Slovene,” “Croat,” or 
“Serb.” For peasants, their local communities, language, culture, and religion 
were the references important to their world. Granted, the process of modern 
nation building had indeed begun during the first third of the nineteenth cen-
tury, and new and abstract forms of national awareness were emerging from 
the identities previously shaped by religion, cultural heritage, and regional 
affiliation. However, at this point none of the future Yugoslav peoples had 
yet formed an integrated community. The emergence of the modern nation 
involved protracted, often contradictory processes with a thoroughly open-
ended result. The idea of a transhistorical existence of peoples, objectified 
by language, culture, or origin, is still popular today. Yet it is an idea that is 
totally inapplicable historically.
Stated simply, the majority of people living at the turn of the century in 
the areas that would later be Yugoslavia were South Slavs, linked by their 
language and cultural kinship. According to today’s categories, these were 
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Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, Montenegrins, and Macedonians. 
According to the identification categories back then, these labels still oscil-
lated between ethnic, national, religious, and regional connotations, which 
would contribute significantly to the problem of a future Yugoslavia, as will 
be shown here.
Despite the extreme disparities among the political territories and cultural 
histories, Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim South Slavs all felt intuitively re-
lated. The reason was that they could communicate freely with one another. 
Most Croats and all Serbs, Montenegrins, and Bosnians speak the same di-
alect, known as Štokavian (after the interrogative pronoun što for “what”).16 
The nineteenth-century language reformers selected this dialect in 1850 in the 
Vienna (Literary) Agreement to serve as the basis of a standardized Serbo-
Croatian language.17 The idioms of the Slovenes and the Macedonians were 
distinctly different and would later develop into their own literary languages. 
Since the early nineteenth century, intellectuals and societal elites thought 
that it would be possible to create (or rather revive) a united South Slavic 
nation based on a shared descent, language, and culture. They believed that 
South Slavs were a primordial and transhistorical people who had suffered 
the unfortunate fate of having been unnaturally torn apart. Their subsequent 
fragmentation into Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was considered superficial, 
which meant that it was possible and imperative that the South Slavic people 
reemerge as a single “Yugoslav” nation despite their present cultural and po-
litical differences.
The protagonists of the South Slavic idea were aided in their effort by 
a degree of conceptual vagueness: in this context, the vocabulary of local 
languages contained just the word narod, a word that made no semantic dis-
tinction between “people” and “nation.” Herein lay a creatively exploitable 
but also dangerous ambivalence. At the same time, the language lacked a term 
for that common idiom referred to then as “Slavic,” “Croatian,” “Serbian,” 
“Bosnian,” or simply “naški” (our language). There was no conceptual equiv-
alent to a label like “German” or “French” that would have vaulted local and 
regional variations, nor was there a common collective term for the advocates 
of South Slavic unity and thus no “positive predisposition” for South Slavic 
(Yugoslav) nation building.18
In all of the regions mentioned here, forms of linguistically and culturally 
determined awareness that could be called protonational existed already in 
the late nineteenth century.19 People identified themselves with certain groups 
that distinguished them from other communities by way of various factors 
like culture and language, sometimes also religion, social milieu, and regional 
origin. In each case, the respective environment determined which of these 
criteria stood at the forefront of such self-identification, as the following ex-
ample of Croatia illustrates.
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If a person traveling through Croatian regions at the turn of the century 
had asked peasants about their national affiliation, this individual would have 
been given a variety of answers.20 People were already identifying themselves 
as “Croats,” but sometimes the label was used to mean ethnicity and other 
times to mean regional affiliation. At the same time, people identified them-
selves — depending on where they lived — as “Slavonian” or “Dalmatian” or 
“Istrian.” “The work of unifying the Croats has not yet been completed,” 
complained the Croat scholar Julije Benešić in 1911. “The lads from Syrmia 
are still ashamed to call themselves Croats publicly.”21
People intuitively considered the Slavic language to be an important iden-
tity marker as long as they lived among Germans, Hungarians, or Italians 
and a clear language barrier existed. Only then did people identify them-
selves primarily as “Slav” or “Croat.” In multireligious milieus in which the 
language was homogenous, such as in Bosnia or Slovenia, faith became the 
main identity marker. Since a Croat could communicate in the same dialect 
as Serbs, Montenegrins, and Bosnians, the language criterion alone was not 
enough to define who a Croat was. A Croat peasant saw himself primarily 
as “Catholic,” “Christian,” or as a “Latin.”22 However, the Croatian national 
identity and Catholicism were not yet identical; after all, Germans, Austrians, 
Italians, and Magyars were also Catholic. Not until much later, in the 1920s, 
would the activities of the Catholic clergy and the Peasants’ Party complete 
the integration of the Croatian nation under the recitals of Catholicism.
Unlike Catholicism, the Orthodox Christian Church was already a strong 
factor in creating the national identification and integration of the Serbs. There 
was a historical reason for this. During the Ottoman period, the religious 
communities were organized as quasi-legal entities with certain autono-
mous rights. These so-called millets had great administrative powers. The 
Orthodox Church could appoint church dignitaries and manage the property 
of the churches, monasteries, and charity institutions. Family and inheritance 
law as well as tax collection was also put in their hands. For an interim, the 
Turks granted the Serbian Orthodox Church sovereignty (autocephaly) to be 
exerted by the patriarch in Peć in Kosovo. The Serbian church thus became 
the sole guardian of the extinct medieval tradition of state. Serbian kings were 
worshiped as saints; hagiographic texts were evocative of the golden age and 
its demise; bishops acted as both spiritual and political leaders. Therefore, 
“Orthodox” was equivalent to “Serbian” both semantically and in meaning 
even before the nationalist period. Toward the end of the 1880s, the Serb ge-
ographer Vladimir Karić noted that, for the Serb, “it is very important to call 
himself ‘Christian,’ or more precisely, ‘Orthodox,’ and he even goes as far as 
not to distinguish between the faith and his nationality, so that he calls it the 
‘Serbian faith’ and consequently wants to call every person a ‘Serb,’ regard-
less the ethnicity, if this person is Orthodox.”23 Because of their Orthodox 
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religion, many Montenegrins understood themselves to be Serbs at the time. 
After all, both peoples had sprouted from the same ethnic soil of the medie-
val Serbian state, and these common origins and the shared religion are what 
exacerbated the split between them, the impact of which is felt still today, 
particularly in the hesitancy to affirm the existence of the Montenegrin nation. 
The merger of “Orthodox” and “Serbian” remained intact in many regions 
until the 1930s. Only later in the twentieth century did the religious meaning 
disappear, and “Serbian,” like “Montenegrin,” was recoded to fit into separate 
national categories.
Unique in European history has been the identity building of Bosnian 
Muslims.24 These people are the descendants of those Slavs of Orthodox, 
Catholic, and other faiths who converted — usually voluntarily — to Islam 
when the Ottomans conquered the territory. The motives for converting were 
manifold and may well have resulted from a mixture of fear and incentive. Non-
Muslims were confronted with fewer chances to advance, a greater tax burden, 
and legal discrimination in matters such as property ownership. Conversion 
to Islam occurred especially in places where the Christian churches had not 
yet firmly established themselves or competed fiercely among themselves for 
power and influence. Upon conversion to Islam, old folk customs were simply 
recast into new molds. Occasionally entire families split into a Muslim and a 
Christian branch, which served as a type of reinsurance to protect themselves 
should power shift again into other hands.25 Outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Slavs in Serbia, Sandžak, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Macedonia also con-
verted to Islam.
Islam was the decisive criterion separating Muslims from the others in 
Bosnia. It formed social identity, defined norms and values, and prescribed 
religious and cultural practices.26 At the turn of the century, the collective 
identity of the Bosnian Muslims was still primarily influenced by religion. 
They fought for religious and cultural autonomy, not national and political 
sovereignty. Only a minority argued for the secularization of the Muslim 
community in the modern era, meaning the separation of religion and civil 
society. However, a nonreligious, national consciousness did not consolidate 
until well into the twentieth century.
In Serbia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, all of which still belonged to the 
Ottoman Empire, the confusion was the greatest, and national identity build-
ing had advanced the least. In the proverbial Macedonian fruit bowl (in French, 
macédoine) lived both Slavic- and Greek-speaking Christians, Turkish- and 
Albanian-speaking Muslims, Jews, Vlachs, and Roma. How large each of the 
communities actually was became the subject of heated ethnographic and 
political controversies.27
According to traditional Islamic order, religion took precedence over ethnic 
distinctions. Therefore, Slavs and Greeks living in the Orthodox millet found it 
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especially important to identify themselves as “Christian” vis-à-vis the ruling 
Turks. Not until the second half of the nineteenth century during a conflict 
within the Bulgarian church did the overarching Christian Orthodox community 
divide along linguistic lines into Bulgarian, Greek, and Serb sectors. It would 
still take several decades before people understood this new differentiation, let 
alone internalize it. Slavic-speaking peasants of Macedonia were quite indif-
ferent to their ethnic background until, with the emergence of the “Macedonian 
question,” they became the object of competing territorial claims and of ethno-
graphic classifications from Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece.28 At the time only a 
hint of a future Slavic-Macedonian national identity could be discerned.
However, for the moment, it was common in Macedonia — as in many cul-
turally heterogeneous border regions like Vojvodina or Istria — for individuals 
to be opportunistic in stating their identity. In Skopska Crna Gora, peasants 
once admitted that sometimes they were Serbs, sometimes Bulgarians, de-
pending how the question was worded.29 This led the Swedish professor Rudolf 
Kjellén to view the population like a type of “flour from which you can bake 
any cake that you want, once the nationality has finally been decided.”30
As was true all over Europe, “imagining the nation” was essentially 
staged by intellectuals, scientists, politicians, and church authorities. On the 
microlevel, it just seemed to be some abstract entity. The coexistence with 
people of other faiths was a daily, socially structured, and usually conflict-free 
experience for many. Everyone always knew who belonged to which group, 
because this was communicated outwardly in names, clothing, religious 
practices, and social barriers such as the marriage ban between Christians 
and Muslims.
Likewise, mutual respect and good neighborly relations were part of 
village life. Birth, marriage, death, as well as house building and harvest-
ing provided occasions for public ritual and festivities through which people 
underscored their communality and mutual dependence. People supported 
each other beyond regional borders through neighborly help in harvesting and 
building (moba and pozajmica) and gathered in the evening to socialize and 
work, an activity known as sijelo.
As in many rural regions in Europe, traditional popular piety dominated 
over canonical stipulations in the population at large. This also offered many 
opportunities for the faiths to mingle. Although people observed the official 
holidays of their respective faith, often these were merely the Christian or 
Muslim adaptations of original customs. In Serbia, the clergy had learned to 
accept that people went to church more to meet each other than to attend the re-
ligious service. Priests tolerated the “freer interaction” that believers had with 
God and Church, including cults worshipping ancestors and house saints.31 As 
late as the 1930s, a study on the Belgrade suburb of Rakovica found that not 
one household there possessed a Bible or a New Testament, although everyone 
12 Part I: 1878 to 1918
believed in God: “We could not find these books anywhere or even a single 
person who would have known something about them. . . . All that everyone 
knows is that there are church books from which the Pope reads prayers.”32
Folk traditions built many bridges between the religious communities. 
A person seeking spiritual guidance or praying for a rapid recovery of health 
might visit the priest in the morning and, just to be on the safe side, the Islamic 
instructor (hodža) in the afternoon. Even today, August 2 is the day on which 
the Orthodox Christians celebrate Saint Elias, the Ilindan, and the Muslims 
the Alidun, a fact that has found its way into the expression “Do podne Ilija, 
od podne Alija” (mornings Elias, afternoons Ali).33
Around 1900, the nation-building process was fully underway through-
out the entire region, with a bit of time lag in certain places. However, the 
protonational communities (later the Serbs, Croats, Muslims, etc.) had not 
yet fully constituted themselves as modern nations. Originally, this was not a 
specifically South Slavic phenomenon. In France, Germany, and Italy, simple 
peasants also had to be transformed first into members of a nation.34 However, 
unlike these parts of Europe, centuries of foreign rule in the Balkans had 
enabled room for ambivalence to emerge, in which avenues for identification 
through language, religion, and political history overlapped. Among other 
factors, there was no clear understanding of what constituted a nation, be it 
a common language and culture (as in Germany and Italy) or the tradition of 
statehood (as in France). On the one hand, the idea of a Kulturnation — as it 
was posited by Johann Gottfried Herder and conveyed in the region — might 
have pointed to the integration of South Slavs into one single nation. On the 
other hand, the heritage left by the Ottoman era included the phenomenon of 
the Konfessionsnation, the confessional nation, which used religious affiliation 
as the basis for differentiating among populations who shared a common lan-
guage. Serbs, Croats, and Muslims spoke (and still speak) similar dialects, but 
they increasingly saw themselves as belonging to different peoples because of 
their faith. As important as the common cultural roots, shared language, and 
regional cohabitation were, the disparate historical-political traditions, espe-
cially those rooted in the different religious worldviews, created fissures too 
deep to allow the idea of a general Yugoslav identity to gain any ground with-
out having to resort to instrumentalization “from above.” Not until the creation 
in 1918 of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes did a strong agency for 
socialization develop that actively advanced Yugoslav nation building.
Demographic Development and Family Structures
In the final thirty years of the nineteenth century, all South Slavic countries 
experienced far-reaching social and economic change. Population growth, 
agrarian and industrial development, and the transition to a monetary and 
market-based economy shook up the traditional social order of village life. The 
 The South Slavic Countries around 1900: The Dawn of a New Century  13
economic dynamic that developed in the center and west of the European con-
tinent was no small contributing factor, one that appeared in the Balkans in the 
form of imperialism. Industrial goods needed new markets and accumulated 
capital needed new opportunities for investment. Railway construction, transre-
gional markets, and the advancement of the monetary economy changed earlier 
forms of economic and communal life, which in turn brought new experiences, 
mentalities, and types of awareness. Unlike western Europe, the outlines of a 
modern industrial society, however, were only vaguely recognizable.
New dynamics were also developing from within society. Between 
1880 and 1910 the population grew rapidly as the mortality rate sank. The 
highest demographic growth took place in Serbia (71.3 percent) and Bosnia-
Herzegovina (63.9 percent), followed by Croatia and Slovenia (38.6 percent), 
Dalmatia (35.7 percent), and Vojvodina (33.6 percent). The slowest population 
to grow was that of Slovenia (9.4 percent).35 Not until the period between the 
two world wars did the demographic discrepancy among the regions diminish. 
Along with Russia and Hungary, southeastern Europe experienced the highest 
birthrate in Europe.36 One of the reasons for the great demographic growth 
lay in the extended rural family, the zadruga (household commune). The ex-
tended family constituted — except in Slovenia — the core of traditional social 
order in the countryside of Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania.37 Sons 
and grandsons remained in their parental homes, while daughters married 
into other zadrugas. Unlike in western Europe, where it was necessary first 
to own land or have a craft before setting up a household, which meant that 
many people married late or not at all, the socioeconomic net of the enlarged 
South Slavic family could always easily integrate additional family members. 
People married young and had many children. In eastern and southeastern 
Europe, the social order lacked an effective regulatory mechanism like that 
which safeguarded western Europe from extreme population growth.
Also unlike western Europe, it was not until this period that the traditional 
union of productive and reproductive functions within the family, of home 
and workplace, began to break apart. The zadruga represented a community 
of property, life, work and authority. Private property did not exist, not even 
money. The head of the household was the father, who derived his role as 
master from his natural authority. He represented the family in public, man-
aged family and economic business, and had the last word in all important 
matters. Women held a subordinate place within the family and had practically 
no rights. In this patriarchal society, strict rules of conduct dictated daily life 
and limited every individual’s personal freedom. In places where the state had 
never gained a foothold, like Montenegro and Kosovo, a strong archaic code 
of honor prevailed, one that included blood feuds.
Yet even in the regions of its historical origin, the zadruga began to fall 
away in a staggered fashion and at different rates of speed. Factors like the 
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growing size of the family, the gradual expansion of the market economy, new 
types of employment in industry and trade, and the dissipation of the patri-
archal order played a role. More and more households were splitting, usually 
when they reached a critical point of twenty to forty members.38 This occurred 
earlier and faster in the east and the south. However, around 1890, about a 
fifth of the population in Croatia and Serbia still lived in an extended family.
Social and Economic Change
Around the turn of the century, about 85 percent of the population in Croatia-
Slavonia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina worked in agriculture, 
and only about 10 percent earned their living in industry, handcraft, and trade; 
the rest worked in independent professions. Only Slovenia differed in this 
respect. Here about two-thirds of the population still worked in the agrarian 
sector, while 11 percent were employed in mining and industry.39
The South Slavic region was divided into a number of distinct systems 
of agricultural law. The manorial system had been ended in 1848/1849 in 
Austria-Hungary, so that peasants were the owners of the land they farmed. 
This led to a differentiated structure of ownership and social life with several 
large modern agricultural enterprises, a wealthy farming middle class, but also 
increasing rural poverty. This lay the foundation for an — albeit modest — in-
dustrial development. The feudal system in Serbia was also abolished after 
the uprisings that occurred from 1815 to 1833. The principle prevailed here, 
too, that those who worked the land should own it. In the remaining regions, 
various forms of feudal dependency still existed. In Istria and Dalmatia the 
systems of colonate (težaština) and socage (kmetije) survived, which obliged 
farmers to turn over a portion of their harvest, anywhere from one-fifth to a 
half. These systems existed in many different variations. It is estimated that 
in 1925 as many as 100,000 peasant families were still working as coloni on 
land they didn’t own.40 Feudal relations in agriculture also remained intact in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina with the čiftlik system. More than half of the families, 
the majority being Orthodox and Catholic socagers, the kmets, were person-
ally unfree, although they did have the right to buy their freedom. They were 
heavily burdened with the obligation to turn over a portion (usually a third) of 
their harvest. In early 1914, a total of 93,336 kmet families were still working 
a third of all arable soil.41 Similar primeval dependencies also prevailed in 
Macedonia and Kosovo.
Where agrarian reforms were undertaken, the efforts were half-hearted 
and contradictory. Legislators in Croatia-Slavonia, Serbia, and Montenegro 
tried to prevent the impoverishment of the peasants by upholding the princi-
ple of indivisible collective property and lifelong family solidarity. In Serbia, 
zadrugas were only permitted to be divided in exceptional cases, and by 
1889 in Croatia this was only permitted if the resulting amount of property 
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allotted each party did not fall short of a legally stipulated minimum. Efforts 
to protect the homesteads (okućje) followed similar ideas. In order to protect 
peasants against excessive indebtedness and forced liquidation, a minimum 
of 8.5 acres including dwellings, draft animals, and inventory were required 
to be mortgage-free and exempt from liquidation. These protective measures 
hindered the mobilization of land and labor, the spread of market-based eco-
nomic relations, and thus the segmentation of property and societal structures 
in rural areas.42
For these reasons, the potential surplus population in agriculture seriously 
encumbered society throughout the entire Balkan region at the turn of the 
century. As the large families split up, landholdings became more and more 
fragmented. Land was divided up into small, unproductive parcels; herds of 
livestock and machinery were torn apart; all too often an entire house was 
dismantled, beam for beam. At least a third of the peasants in the Yugoslav re-
gion worked less than five acres of land, another third only up to twelve acres. 
Landholdings of any considerable size were only found in central Croatia 
and in Vojvodina; they were practically nonexistent in Serbia, Dalmatia, and 
Carinthia.43
The result was indebtedness and poverty. Anyone with less than twelve 
acres to farm could just barely survive; those who owned less than five acres 
were in dire straits. In the period between 1910 and 1912, two-thirds of the 
farmers in Serbia could not earn the existential minimum. More than half 
of them did not own a yoke of oxen; a third had neither a plow nor even a 
bed.44 Poverty was also indescribable in Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, Istria, 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was the similarity of these circumstances in which 
they lived and of the crises they had experienced that would later contribute 
considerably to the political merger of the South Slavic peoples.
Agrarian productivity was low, and many households persevered on sub-
sistence farming. Still, step by step, the market economy was making inroads 
into rural regions, first in southern Hungary, Syrmia, and Slavonia, later in 
Serbia, and finally in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro. 
However, this left farming households at the mercy of cyclical fluctuations in 
the economy. The majority of them lacked the capital and the knowledge to 
intensify their agricultural production. Land use and cultivation techniques 
remained primitive with little diversification of produce; artificial fertilizers 
and modern farm machinery were unknown, as were root crops and industrial 
crops, and little changed in this regard until the interwar period.
The increase in agrarian productivity continued to lag far behind the 
dynamic growth in population. Instead of intensifying yields, peasants tended 
to increase arable farmland. They turned woods and meadows into grain 
fields, reduced livestock farming in favor of crop farming, and shifted their 
own eating habits from a meat-based diet to a vegetarian one. Despite these 
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efforts, food provision remained precarious. In 28 percent of the Serb farming 
households, the food shortages appeared each year by the end of October; in 
another 46 percent, the deficit appeared in January and February, all of which 
had serious consequences for the nutrition and state of health of the rural 
population.45 About a hundred years after much of Europe had been cursed 
with rural overpopulation, the South Slavic countries first found themselves 
smitten with it, at a point when the curse had long been broken elsewhere.
As in many European societies, people sought a way out of their predica-
ment by migrating in search of work. In doing so, they perpetuated traditional 
forms of periodic migratory labor known as pečalba. On the eve of the First 
World War, nearly 150,000 men from Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, 
and Macedonia made their way each year into the neighboring regions to hire 
themselves out as migratory artisans, wage laborers, or small businessmen. 
Istria and Dalmatia were also classic emigration regions.
Later than everywhere else in Europe, transcontinental labor migration 
did not take place to a significant degree until the 1880s. Then, between 1899 
and 1913, more than a half million South Slavs left for the New World, four-
fifths of whom were from the Habsburg monarchy.46 Due to cyclical economic 
fluctuations, countries overseas limited immigration starting at the turn of 
the century, which meant that emigration provided far less relief to the taxed 
job market than had been the case in earlier decades in places like Germany 
or Scandinavia. The majority of the structurally underemployed jobseekers 
remained in their own country.
The low level of agricultural productivity also hampered development 
in trade and industry. Agricultural exports did not generate profits that could 
have been invested in industry, nor did a greater domestic demand for finished 
goods emerge in rural areas. People were simply too poor to be able to afford 
things that they did not produce themselves. Therefore, industrialization in 
the South Slavic countries began later, progressed slower, and developed in 
other branches than it did in the rest of Europe. Whereas the latecomers, 
Sweden and Denmark, did manage to initiate viable industrialization in the 
nineteenth century, and Italy, Hungary, and Russia created at least regional 
industrial centers, the Balkan countries — as well as Spain and Portugal — did 
not experience any substantial industrial growth.47 Nor would there be any 
major impetus in industrialization until the 1930s; in fact, the rapid switch to 
advanced industrialization did not occur until 1945.
This was caused by a bundle of factors: the backward transportation 
infrastructure that hampered the development of transregional markets, the 
chronic lack of capital, the low level of education and training, and — last but 
not least — the powerful competition from developed regions of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire. Starting at the turn of the century, the number of factories 
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and employed workers increased and levels of production grew annually by 
more than 10 percent, albeit from a very low starting point. Unfortunately, at 
the same time, the discrepancy to the rest of Europe also grew.48 In Croatia-
Slavonia, the number of industrial workers rose from 9,832 to 23,604 in the 
years between 1890 and 1910. In Serbia, this number had only risen to 16,095 
by 1910, despite the efforts made by the government in its industrial policy. In 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, more than 65,000 industrial workers were employed in 
1912/1913 as a result of the Austro-Hungarian development policy.49
Since proto-industries had been weak in southeastern Europe during the 
early modern period, industry developed out of artisan crafts more than out 
of manufacturing. It was not textile manufacturing (as in England) or the coal, 
iron, and steel industry (as in Germany) that stood at the forefront in the be-
ginning, but agriculture (mills and breweries) and forestry (timber and wood 
processing). In 1910, food production generated 55 percent of the revenue of 
all factory production in Serbia, while the textile industry only generated 8 
percent. In Croatia, the leading branch of industry was timber, and industry 
would not start to diversify significantly until 1910.50 Due to the lower level of 
technological requirements in this sector, the demand for machinery did not 
intensify as a spin-off effect. At first, heavy industry only played a subordinate 
role, except in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the Austro-Hungarian colonial 
regime had ignited a major thrust in industrialization.51
Life in the City
Until the interwar period, urbanization developed moderately and was greatly 
influenced by agriculture. Railroad construction, mining, and factories drew 
people from the countryside, and cities grew and changed the way they looked. 
However, some qualification is necessary here with regard to the use of the 
term “city.” On average, a city only had a few thousand inhabitants. In the 
thirty years prior to the First World War, the urban population increased 
threefold. Still, Belgrade only had 68,481 inhabitants in 1900; Zagreb 57,690; 
Sarajevo 38,035 (1895); and Ljubljana 46,000 (1910). The number of migrants 
to the cities was enormous, and yet in 1910 only 13.2 percent of the Serb pop-
ulation lived in cities. In Croatia the figure was just 8.5 percent. Only Russia 
and Finland had lower figures.52
The migration from the countryside also changed the look and structure of 
the (sub)urban areas. The more newcomers arrived, the greater the village way 
of life infiltrated daily city life. The mass of urbanites lived under appalling 
conditions in small, ground-level farm buildings, not in tenement blocks and 
rear buildings as in western Europe. Living space was excessively expensive, 
overcrowded, poorly ventilated, squalid, and without any sanitary facilities. 
In 1906, an inquiry survey reported among other things “that a close causal 
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connection existed between life in such dwellings and the three greatest en-
emies of public health — tuberculosis, alcoholism, and venereal disease.”53 
Only a small, wealthy elite could afford to live in comfortable townhouses.
The cityscape was not dominated by fuming smokestacks and proletarian 
hardship, but by the shabby dwellings of former rural inhabitants and small 
business dealers as well as the growing army of job-seeking day laborers.54 
Every other city dweller in Zagreb, Sarajevo, and Belgrade still worked in 
agriculture. In the suburbs, many farmed plots of land and kept poultry, pigs, 
or a cow. Perhaps the most prominent characteristic of southeastern European 
urbanization before the Second World War is that many cities were actu-
ally nothing more than gigantic villages. The only places that underwent a 
“European” urban metamorphosis were Ljubljana, Zagreb, Belgrade, and a 
few mid-sized cities.
In Serbia a great effort was made starting in the 1870s to remove all traces 
of the Ottoman past so that, as the city planner Emilijan Josimović expressed 
it, the “capital does not retain the form that barbarism gave it.”55 Belgrade’s 
reconstruction was modeled on Vienna and its grand circular boulevard, the 
Ringstrasse. The only structures that were left as reminders of the 350 years 
of Turkish rule were the citadel, two mosques, and a fountain with Arabic 
inscriptions.56 Almost simultaneously with western European metropolises, 
Belgrade was outfitted in the 1890s with electrical lighting and streetcars, 
and after 1900 with canalization and a water supply system.57 Irrespective of 
the modest conditions from which the reconstruction was starting, the city 
planners were driven by the desire to simply skip over the laborious catch-up 
process and to hitch up an “airplane motor to the oxen cart,” as an observer 
put it.58 Belgrade became a paradigm of modernity, a shop window displaying 
a culture that was more or less imitating the West.
About 1900, daily life and habits in the cities changed at a breathtaking 
pace, evident first in the spread of traditional costumes (građanski kostim). 
In Belgrade, hats and felt caps replaced the traditional fez. Instead of gath-
ering together in the evening, as was widely done in the villages, the elegant 
reception day žur ( jour de réception) became fashionable among the Belgrade 
upper class.59 Also in other cities of the South Slavic region, the upper esche-
lons of society began to adopt European forms of socializing and lifestyles, 
such as salons, leisure activity, and interior design.60 Bourgeois attitudes to-
ward romantic love and marriage ideals also began to take hold.
However, there were also interactions between the distant worlds of the 
townhouse and the farmhouse. Lifestyle, fashion, and etiquette gradually 
made inroads into everyday peasant life. “Where a wooden cup had once 
been enough, one now finds a glass; the petroleum lamp replaces kindling 
wood,” a foreign traveler observed in 1897. “European farm wagons with iron 
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fittings are replacing the old prehistorical vehicle with the creaking wooden 
wheels.”61 Whereas the respective local folk costumes were still being worn in 
the countryside up to the end of the nineteenth century, the men and women in 
the cities were already wearing West European clothing. Changes in customs 
spread from the cities outward. People began to address each other with the 
formal form of “you” instead of the more commonly used familiar form and 
to greet each other with the words “dobar dan” (good day) — known as the 
“German form” of greeting.62
Progress and Uncertainty
The desire for national emancipation was generated not least by the awareness 
of how backward things were. Members of the elite considered liberation from 
foreign rule to be the prerequisite for a better future and an emancipatory 
strategy to further development that would finally enable the people of the 
region to participate in European civilization as members of equal standing. 
Yet the harbingers of the new European era, like technical progress, bourgeois 
culture, and liberal social morality, descended upon agrarian society in south-
eastern Europe so suddenly that the changes severely shook the long-standing 
mainstays of identity and uprooted traditional values and societal relations. In 
particular, the countries formerly under Ottoman rule experienced a profound 
break with the traditions of their Muslim heritage, which had shaped daily life 
and society for four hundred years. Radical societal change subdued people’s 
optimism about progress and caused anxious uncertainty about the future. The 
key question was how their own social-cultural identity was to be reconciled 
with the new challenges facing them.
Since the Enlightenment, the intellectual elite of southeastern Europe 
had cultivated the idea of societal progress, which they associated with words 
like “reason” and “science” and equated with “Europeanization.” 63 During the 
nineteenth century, the enthusiasts of this intellectual interaction with Europe 
were young students attending higher schools of learning and universities in 
Russia, Germany, France, Italy, Hungary, and Austria. Over the course of 
the next few decades, a Europe-oriented intelligentsia emerged from their 
ranks, comprised of people familiar with the ideas of liberalism, socialism, 
and Russian populism.64 At the same time, Muslim educated classes were 
adopting Islamic ideologies and movements from the Arab world, Asia, and 
Russia.65 Islamic scholars also studied European philosophy intensely, es-
pecially rationalism. In view of the decline of the once powerful Ottoman 
Empire, they asked, how were the administrative, economic, military, and 
judiciary achievements of the West to be explained? 66
The younger generations thirsted after answers to the big questions of 
this new era. How could the curse of backwardness be overcome and the 
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intellectual and technical level of “Europe” achieved? Which means were best 
to fight the prevailing patriarchal mentality and to create a sense of national 
identity among the rural population? How could the interests of the great 
powers be confronted and a body politic organized?
The educated classes of southeastern Europe took all the major intellec-
tual and political movements of Europe (or of the Islamic world) with a grain 
of salt. However, this does not corroborate a popular stereotypical assumption 
that the absence of the Reformation and the Enlightenment caused the Balkans 
to harbor long-standing, specifically anti-Western attitudes hostile to modern-
ization.67 The decisive factor was not the fundamental differences between 
the civilizations of the Latin West and the Orthodox or Islamic East, but the 
fact that the reception of major ideas took place under thoroughly different 
societal circumstances. At the turn of the century, more than four-fifths of 
the population made their living from agriculture. Anyone seeking to gain 
widespread resonance for their ideas at a time when developments were only 
beginning to politicize the mass public still had to take into consideration the 
attitudes, values, and interests of the peasantry.
Up to that point, it had not been possible to develop an industrial soci-
ety modeled on the West, even though there were clear indications that the 
political system, public life, national cultures, lifestyles, and value orienta-
tions in the cities were undergoing a gradual process of embourgeoisement.68 
Conditions for this had been particularly favorable in Slovenia, Croatia, and 
Slavonia. In the nineteenth century, a small bourgeoisie had developed from 
the ranks of the traditional urban classes, wealthy farmers, the nobility, ar-
tisans, merchants, government bureaucrats, and military officers. What the 
newly emerging business circles increasingly yearned to see was the industrial 
production associated with smoke billowing from ever more factory chimneys. 
Their vocabulary was augmented by new words like “producers,” “compe-
tition,” “business cycles,” “capitalism,” and “working class.”69 The situation 
was quite different in the peasant societies formerly under Ottoman rule, 
because the majority of the urban Muslims had emigrated at the time when 
the Ottoman influence was being eradicated in these regions. The creation of 
a bourgeoisie here, as in Serbia, had to start literally from scratch. However, 
in less than three generations, a new social elite had developed that consisted 
of people from poor rural circumstances who had risen to higher posts in 
government service or established themselves in independent professions.
In all of the South Slavic countries, improved educational opportunities 
in rural communities and greater regional mobility among the well-schooled 
and university-educated youth proved to be a powerful motor for an intellec-
tual and national awakening. Back in the 1860s and 1870s, the first generation 
educated abroad had brought the ideas of liberalism to Serbia, which was also 
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reflected in the political system established in 1881. Both the ruling Progress 
Party and the Liberals favored the idea of imitating the Western path to devel-
opment as quickly as possible, in order to abolish the “limitations of outdated 
patriarchal Serbia.”70 But only a small elite were convinced of the feasibility to 
simply impose the European model of progress on their own country through 
a type of “revolution from above.” Serbia lacked the underlying support of 
the bourgeois classes, who could have anchored the Western type of mod-
ernization more firmly into local society. Besides the royal family, a total of 
six millionaires lived in Belgrade in 1900; in Zurich alone there were 500.71
It was not the economic sphere but the political one that provided the 
realm in which to develop all things new. Every party in Serbia took up the 
cause of political freedom, yet no party had worked out a clear economic re-
form program. This demonstrates a nearly unbridgeable gulf between political 
modernity and economic backwardness. The Serb newspaper Dnevni List 
(Daily Newspaper) illustrated it in the following way: “Nowhere else in the 
world can one see the miraculous and absurd situation that modern ideas of 
political and social progress are advocated in the parliament by village cash-
loan givers, former municipal cops, and illiterate bench-sitters and chicken 
sellers.”72
This entire debate over catch-up development and Europeanization oc-
curred against the backdrop of an intensifying competition between the major 
powers in the era of imperialism. Granted, the Balkans had been the object of 
hegemonic power projection for centuries.
However, advanced industrialization and economic global expansion cre-
ated hegemony of a new sort at the end of the nineteenth century. Increasingly 
the aim was to secure new markets and capital-intensive investments. Trade 
policy, lending policy, and railway construction created new economic de-
pendencies that the new Balkan states found hard if not impossible to avoid 
at first. After the Congress of Berlin, Serbia had been forced to sign disad-
vantageous trade contracts with Austria-Hungary and soon fell deeply into 
debt. Between 1880 and 1914, its liabilities grew from 16.5 million to 903.8 
million French francs.73 For this reason, the debate on Europeanization was 
always accompanied by a fear of foreign dependence, as is illustrated in the 
controversy of railroad construction.
At the beginning of the 1880s, Serbia and Montenegro were the only 
countries in Europe without a railway system. In parliament there was stiff 
resistance to the railroad construction stipulated by the Congress of Berlin. 
Was Serbian society even ready for the technological revolution, asked the 
members of parliament? Didn’t the imposed modernization intently create 
new dependencies on foreign lenders? Serbia would “suffer the same fate 
as the Indians following the discovery of America,” it was said. Think of 
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Columbus, who “brought European culture to America, but with it also the 
chains of slavery.”74
Broadly speaking, the elites in Serbia and Montenegro split into two 
main groups that roughly equated the distinction between “Liberals” and 
“Conservatives” in Europe or between “Westerners” and “Slavophiles” in 
Russia: namely, a European-modern and a Slavic-traditional group.75 While 
the liberal, state-oriented “Westerners” pushed for the separation of church 
and state and for institutional, legal, and constitutional reform, the conserva-
tive, community-oriented “traditionalists” tended to cultivate the autochthon 
roots of a meta-historical, natural, and organically perceived national iden-
tity. Although both movements envisioned a better future, the former greatly 
emphasized institutional change, while the latter stressed a distinct élan vital 
of the Slavs.76
Parallel to this and in a process observable throughout the entire Islamic 
world, the Muslim intelligentsia also developed two wings, a European-laicist 
and an Islamic-religious one.77 Members of the former group had been edu-
cated in secular schools and at European universities, opposed traditional, 
religious erudition, and favored a secular, politically determined concept of 
nation. However, the majority of the intelligentsia still adhered to the Islamic 
type of Bosnian Muslim collective identity. Muslims had been catapulted 
into a new world by the Austro-Hungarian project to impose European civi-
lization. The former political legitimacy of Islam, as it had been universally 
understood, had been forced to give way to a heteronomous and secular state 
legitimacy imported from the West, one that fundamentally rocked its social 
and cultural core. The challenge before them was to harmonize all that was 
new with that which was tried and tested, to conjoin the universal aim of 
modernization with the preservation of cultural-religious identity. But how?
During these years, the popularity of the reformist movement of Salafism, 
which reinterpreted ancient writings in pursuit of what the reformers con-
sidered true Islam, helped introduce two different strategies of adaptation. 
One strategy postulated the compatibility of Islam with Western rationalism 
and recommended the “modernization of Islam.” It was argued that faith and 
science had not been contradictory even in earlier eras. In his work Islam 
and Culture, published in 1894, Osman Nuri Hadžić, for example, proposed 
a rational-enlightened model for the future.78 The other, at first less popular 
strategy emphasized the universality and values of the religion and pushed for 
an “Islamization of modernity.” Pan-Islamism was also part of this tradition of 
thought, an idea that found a voice in the magazine Behar (Blossom) starting 
early in the twentieth century.79
All this discourse on modernity, progress, and the future appears closely 
connected to that on cultural identity, collective values, and national assertion 
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and dignity. As was the case throughout Europe, the new challenges prompted 
strong counterreactions. Anxiety about the future and antimodern reflexes 
were cloaked in egalitarian debate; rural traditions, local self-administration, 
and the extended family were adjured, in order to fight off the subversive trend 
of the new era. Wasn’t the contrived finery of the capital, Belgrade, which so 
flagrantly contradicted the poverty-ridden world of the masses, no more than a 
subversive attack against Serbia’s socially just, agrarian society? Why should 
the capital city lead the outside world to believe in its progress and high culture 
when in reality the countryside was plagued with poverty?80
It was against this backdrop around the turn of the century that the fun-
damental dichotomy between urban and rural emerged, a dichotomy between 
modern, Western-influenced urbanity, on the one hand, and village life with its 
traditional social culture, on the other. The city represented the condensation 
of all hopes and fears with regard to modernity; it was the metaphor both for 
progress and decline, the promise for a better future and the signal to return to 
the old social and moral order. What is more, the urban–rural dichotomy also 
symbolized the social dividing line between “rulers” and “people,” between 
the “city-coat wearers” (kaputaši) and those wearing peasant costume.
As was typical for all of Europe, this confrontation between the famil-
iar and the foreign, between the supposed security provided by patriarchal 
values and the attractions and adventures of urban progressivity served as 
a blueprint for numerous literary works.81 “Progress” was often perceived 
as culturally foreign and thus radicalized fears of a loss of identity and a de-
cline of morals — fears articulated in Serbian literature by Laza Kostić, Đura 
Jakšić, or Stevan Sremac and in Bosnian literature by Safet Beg Bašagić and 
Edhem Mulabdić.82 Urban and rural became symbolic representations for the 
contrary forces of change and persistence and for the contradictory fears of 
a return to atavism and barbarism, for some people, and of the irretrievable 
loss of the tried and true, for others. An entire legion of ethnographers, village 
researchers, and historians set out to trace the true roots of Serbian, Croatian, 
and Slovenian culture and to reconstruct the pastoral world of peasantry as a 
counterweight to the raw industrial present. Often modernity meant foreign-
ness, even alienation, “something that should be eliminated,” as a member of 
the Serbian parliament expressed it.83
Both the Liberals and the Radicals in Serbia tried to dissipate the tensions 
between traditional social structures and patriarchal values, on the one side, 
and the needs of modern constitutionality, economic management, and gover-
nance, on the other. As legislators, they thus repeatedly relied on established 
common law when reforming agrarian, family, and trade and commercial law 
in order to retain tested and trusted social institutions of village life and thus 
avoid the upheaval of capitalism.84 This was consistent with the thinking of 
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the socialist Svetozar Marković, one of Serbia’s most important intellectuals 
in the nineteenth century. Influenced by Russian revolutionaries, he advocated 
an agrarian socialism that was based on the societal order of the village and 
emphasized the self-administration (samouprava) of the traditional extended 
family (zadruga) and the community (opština). He considered collective 
ownership and collective production to be the more humane alternative to 
the exploitative capitalistic state.85 The following generation of politicians 
also thought technology and science should be advanced, but — according to 
Nikola Pašić, the leader of the Radical Party — they both were to be used in 
the “Slavic-Serbian spirit.”86 This was also very similar to the position of the 
founders of the Croatian Peoples’ Peasant Party.
The majority of Muslim intellectuals decided to favor a pragmatic strat-
egy that adopted a select number of European standards, just as Turkish and 
Egyptian authors had. Bosnian spiritual leaders found citations in classic 
writings to justify to their fellow countrymen why they should enter mili-
tary service in the hated Christian army. Compromise was recommended 
in other questions as well, such as in the matter of integrating the sharia 
into the Habsburg legal and justice system.87 The predominant paradigm was 
therefore not to fetishize the past or the religion, let alone some nebulous 
anti-Westernism, but to attempt to reconcile the imported ideas, values, and 
structures with the dominant societal conditions.
By the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century, the glorified view 
of the Balkans as an exotic and romantic region was no longer able to bear 
up against societal realities. Just as everywhere else in Europe, the emerging 
industrialization, urbanization, social mobilization, and other fundamental 
processes of modernity had already shaken traditional agrarian society to 
the core, even though industrialized, urbanized society with its characteristic 
ways of life, aesthetics, and scientific-technological momentum would not 
fully develop until decades later. The socioeconomic upheavals in Europe’s 
southeast region became noticeable later than in western Europe and occurred 
slower, less dynamically, and in other directions. Compared with England, 
France, and Germany they appeared modest; even Russia and Italy were far 
more advanced. Still, measured against what had existed before, the change 
was indeed spectacular not only because it created younger, mobile, and ed-
ucated generations who carried forth the spirit of change, but also because 
it intensified tensions between social experiences and political realities and 
thus brought about nationalism. In this sense, an irreversible transformation 
process was forging ahead that not only thoroughly changed socioeconomic 
realities but also pushed the national question high up on the political agenda.
